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Abstract
This project involves an exploration of the RSA cryptosystem and the mathematical con-
cepts embedded within it. The first goal is to explain what the cryptosystem consists of,
and why it works. Additional goals include detailing some techniques for primality test-
ing, discussing integer factorization, modular exponentiation, and digital signatures, and
explaining the importance of these topics to the security and efficiency of the RSA cryp-
tosystem. The final goal is to implement all of these components into a full simulation of
the entire RSA cryptosystem using the Python programming language.
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1 Background
The RSA cryptosystem was created by three MIT professors, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len
Adleman and published in an article named A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public-Key Cryptosystems in 1978. While the cryptosystem is named for this trio of mathe-
maticians, it is less widely known that a man named Clifford Cocks had actually discovered
the algorithm first while working in a classified environment for the British cryptologic agency
GCHQ. Clifford Cock’s discovery of the RSA algorithm was revealed more than two decades
after the publication by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [Klima, Sigmon].
RSA was the world’s first public-key cryptosystem, which is part of why the algorithm is so
well-known and popular. Being a public-key cryptosystem stems from being asymmetric. This
means that the encryption key is made public knowledge and does not in any way give clues
to an outsider or even the person sending the message about how to obtain the decryption key.
In a more formalized assertion, a public key cryptosystem is a system in which the encryption
function f can be public knowledge without revealing f−1. This inability to determine f−1
from the encryption function f comes from the practical difficulty of factoring large primes
[Klima, Sigmon]. This factorization problem allows RSA to be an extremely secure cryptosys-
tem. Because of its security it is most widely used today to provide privacy and ensure the
authenticity of digital data. RSA is implemented by web servers and browsers to secure web
traffic, it is used to ensure privacy and authenticity of email, and it is frequently used in elec-
tronic credit card payment systems. These are all applications in which security of digital data
is of extreme importance, which exemplifies the high level of security RSA can provide. While
RSA is extremely secure, the mathematics that underlie the system are fairly simple as will be
shown.
2 How RSA Works
It is important to note that RSA depends on the numerical conversion of a message. To do
this, one can map the letters of the alphabet to a corresponding element in the ring Z26. This
mapping can be outlined as follows: A 7→ 0, B 7→ 1, C 7→ 2, . . . , Z 7→ 25 [Klima, Sigmon].
The only setback to this method is that only capital letters can be used in creating messages to
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send. To improve upon this method, ASCII representations of letters, symbols and spaces can
be used. With ASCII, lower and upper case letters have different numerical representations, so
messages converted using ASCII are able to use upper and lower case letters as well as spaces
and symbols. All of these elements within a message are preserved throughout the encryption
and decryption process. In the Python program included as part of this thesis, this is the
method used to convert strings of text to their numerical representations. Any way you do
it, you must convert the string of characters that make up your messages into a numerical
equivalent. We let this numerical message be x. To get started with the RSA encryption
algorithm, we must first choose two distinct prime numbers p and q. We then must determine
n = pq as well as m = (p−1)(q−1). Next we would need to determine an encryption exponent
a ∈ Z∗m which satisfies gcd(a,m) = 1. A decryption exponent b ∈ Z∗m will also need to be found
that satisfies ab = 1 mod m. We cannot choose any number as our a because in order for RSA
to work, a must be relatively prime to m. This in turn allows us to be able to find a value of
b that when multiplied by a yields the value 1 mod m. These two conditions on a and b are
extremely important. When met, they force the following equation to be true: xab = x mod n.
This equation shows that once we raise a plaintext message to the encryption exponent, we
can raise the resulting ciphertext to the decryption exponent then reduce mod n and the same
plaintext message x will be the end result [Klima, Sigmon].
Finding an encryption exponent a that is relatively prime to a chosen m is fairly straightfor-
ward. Once an a is found, finding the decryption exponent b requires the use of the Euclidean
algorithm. The Euclidean algorithm can also be used to confirm that your choice of a is indeed
relatively prime to m as well. So, knowing the Euclidean algorithm and how to implement it is
fairly important when looking for parameters that will allow the RSA algorithm to work.
Suppose you want to receive RSA encrypted messages, so you must first generate the keys.
For the sake of this first example very small numbers will be used to show how the Euclidean
algorithm works to help choose the encryption and decryption exponents. Suppose you select
primes p = 47 and q = 61. This would give n = pq = 47 · 61 = 2867. You must then calculate
m = (p−1)(q−1), which is (47−1) ·(61−1), or 46 ·60 = 2760. Now you would need to establish
an a such that a and 2760 have no common divisors greater than 1. Suppose you choose a = 67.
Now you can use the Euclidean algorithm to prove that this choice of a is actually relatively
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prime to m as follows. Begin by dividing m by a, while noting the quotient and remainder.
This process will then be repeated, each time using the divisor from the previous step and then
dividing that by the remainder from the previous step. The last nonzero remainder in this
process is the gcd of a and m:
2760 = 67(41) + 13
67 = 13(5) + 2
13 = 2(6) + 1
2 = 1(2) + 0.
Because the last nonzero remainder is 1, the gcd of 67 and 2760 is 1, and so the two numbers are
relatively prime, which justifies the choice of a. Now we can find a valid decryption exponent.
We are looking for a value of b that satisfies ab = 1 mod m. In other words we need a value of b
such that 67b = 1 mod 2760. The Euclidean algorithm equations used to validate our choice of
a can also be used to find b as well. The Euclidean algorithm equations can be rewritten in a
way that allows us to work backwards to find the multiplicative inverse of our a mod m. This
can be done as follows:
1 = 13− 2(6)
= 13− (67− 13(5))(6)
= −67(6) + 13(31)
= −67(6) + (2760− 67(41))(31)
= 2760(31) + 67(−1277).
The last line gives 2760(31)+67(−1277) = 1, which can be reduced mod 2760, giving the result
67(−1277) = 1 mod 2760. This tells us that −1277 is a multiplicative inverse of 67 mod 2760.
However, we do not want to use a negative number for b, but since we are working mod 2760,
we can see that −1277 mod 2760 = 1483. This means that 1483 can work as our decryption
exponent b. Now that we have determined valid encryption and decryption exponents, we have
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obtained all the information we need to make the encryption exponent and modulus n public
and begin receiving encrypted messages that only our decryption exponent b can decrypt. We
can now do some examples using RSA with our parameters n = 2867, encryption exponent
a = 67, and decryption exponent b = 1483.
Example 1: Encryption
Suppose someone wants to send us a message, specifically the message URGENT: Meet at dusk!.
First, the sender must convert their message into its numerical equivalent. This can be done
using the ASCII correspondences shown in Table 1. Using this method, the message URGENT:
Meet at dusk! converts into the following string of numbers:
085082071069078084058032077101101116032097116032100117115107033.
At this point, the sender will use the encryption calculation to encrypt the message. Recall that
x represents the message to be encrypted. The encryption calculation is: xa mod n. Because
the message is such a large number, we must split it into pieces and do separate calculations
in order to complete the encryption process. The pieces of the message to be encrypted cannot
be bigger than n = 2867 in this example, or else they could not be decrypted correctly, and
so we will split the message into groups of three digits. In other words, we must encrypt one
character at a time. This splits our plaintext into the groups 085, 082, 071, 069, 078, 084, 058,
032, 077, 101, 101, 116, 032, 097, 116, 032, 100, 117, 115, 107, 033. Now the sender can take
these pieces of the plaintext and use the encryption calculation to find the ciphertext as follows:
08567 mod 2867 = 1533
08267 mod 2867 = 2663
07167 mod 2867 = 1978
06967 mod 2867 = 2595
07867 mod 2867 = 884
08467 mod 2867 = 525
05867 mod 2867 = 1168
03267 mod 2867 = 578
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Decimal Representation Character Decimal Representation Character
32 Space 80 P
33 ! 81 Q
34 ” 82 R
35 # 83 S
36 $ 84 T
37 % 85 U
38 & 86 V
39 ’ 87 W
40 ( 88 X
41 ) 89 Y
42 * 90 Z
43 + 91 [
44 , 92 \
45 – 93 ]
46 . 94 ˆ
47 / 95
48 0 96 ‘
49 1 97 a
50 2 98 b
51 3 99 c
52 4 100 d
53 5 101 e
54 6 102 f
55 7 103 g
56 8 104 h
57 9 105 i
58 : 106 j
59 ; 107 k
60 < 108 l
61 = 109 m
62 > 110 n
63 ? 111 o
64 @ 112 p
65 A 113 q
66 B 114 r
67 C 115 s
68 D 116 t
69 E 117 u
70 F 118 v
71 G 119 w
72 H 120 x
73 I 121 y
74 J 122 z
75 K 123 {
76 L 124 |
77 M 125 }
78 N 126 ∼
79 O
Table 1: ASCII Correspondences
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07767 mod 2867 = 2699
10167 mod 2867 = 1058
10167 mod 2867 = 1058
11667 mod 2867 = 1091
03267 mod 2867 = 578
09767 mod 2867 = 2794
11667 mod 2867 = 1091
03267 mod 2867 = 578
10067 mod 2867 = 1286
11767 mod 2867 = 748
11567 mod 2867 = 1726
10767 mod 2867 = 710
03367 mod 2867 = 613.
The sender can then send the string of ciphertext numbers 1533, 2663, 1978, 2595, 884, 525,
1168, 578, 2699, 1058, 1058, 1091, 578, 2794, 1091, 578, 1286, 748, 1726, 710, 613 to us. It is
important to note that with such a small value of n forcing such small groupings of plaintext
digits, this particular encryption is insecure, as it is vulnerable to being broken by frequency
analysis. In practice, the primes chosen to form n are extremely large and would help to
eliminate this insecurity.
Example 1: Decryption
After we receive the encrypted message formed above, we can then decrypt the message using
the decryption key. This is how the decryption process works. Suppose we refer to the encrypted
message as c. The decryption calculation is cb mod 2867. This must be done for each of the
ciphertext numbers in order to reveal the message as follows:
15331483 mod 2867 = 085
26631483 mod 2867 = 082
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19781483 mod 2867 = 071
25951483 mod 2867 = 069
8841483 mod 2867 = 078
5251483 mod 2867 = 084
11681483 mod 2867 = 058
5781483 mod 2867 = 032
26991483 mod 2867 = 077
10581483 mod 2867 = 101
10581483 mod 2867 = 101
10911483 mod 2867 = 116
5781483 mod 2867 = 032
27941483 mod 2867 = 097
10911483 mod 2867 = 116
5781483 mod 2867 = 032
12861483 mod 2867 = 100
7481483 mod 2867 = 117
17261483 mod 2867 = 115
7101483 mod 2867 = 107
6131483 mod 2867 = 027.
If we convert these decrypted numbers back into characters according the ASCII correspon-
dences in Table 1, we see that it converts back into the original plaintext URGENT: Meet at
dusk!.
In Example 1 the size of our encrypted blocks was only three digits, meaning that each
character was encrypted and decrypted separately. This is ineffective and insecure, since en-
crypting one character at a time yields a substitution cipher which can be easily broken through
frequency analysis. To really take advantage of the security RSA can offer, we must encrypt
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larger groupings of digits. However, in order to be decrypted, the groupings encrypted cannot
be larger than the value of n. So, in general, taking advantage of the security RSA can offer
requires a large value for n. In the following we will do this same example, but with larger
groupings in order to show the encryption and decryption process with more secure parameters.
Example 2: Encryption
We will use the same plaintext in this example, URGENT: Meet at dusk!, which converted
under the ASCII correspondences into the following string of numbers:
085082071069078084058032077101101116032097116032100117115107033.
In this example we will use primes p = 1009 and q = 1511, which give n = 1524599 and
m = 1522080. A possible value for a is 15221, which we can confirm is a valid encryption
exponent as follows:
1522080 = 15221(99) + 15201
15221 = 15201(1) + 20
15201 = 20(760) + 1
20 = 1(20) + 0.
Since the last nonzero remainder is 1, the gcd of 15221 and 1522080 is 1, and so the two numbers
are relatively prime, justifying our choice of a. We can rewrite these equations to find a valid
value for b as follows:
1 = 15201− 20(760)
= 15201− (15221− 15201(1))(760)
= −15221(760) + 15201(761)
= −15221(760) + (1522080− 15221(99))(761)
= 1522080(761) + 15221(−76099).
The last line gives 1522080(761)+15221(−76099) = 1, which can be reduced mod 1522080, giv-
ing 15221(−76099) = 1 mod 1522080. This tells us that a value that works for b is −76099 mod
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1522080 = 1445981. Now we can begin the encryption process. With our value of n = 1524599,
we can make plaintext groups of two characters for the encryption and decryption process,
which will have equivalent numerical lengths of 6 digits. With two characters in each group,
our plaintext numbers will be 085082, 071069, 078084, 058032, 077101, 101116, 032097, 116032,
100117, 115107, 033120. Since there are an odd number of characters in our message, our last
group only had one character. To maintain consistency with the group size, we have added a
single random character to the end of our message, namely x. We can now encrypt our message
via the following calculations:
08508215221 mod 1524599 = 508128
07106915221 mod 1524599 = 259410
07808415221 mod 1524599 = 1505416
05803215221 mod 1524599 = 1516259
07710115221 mod 1524599 = 812195
10111615221 mod 1524599 = 552080
03209715221 mod 1524599 = 743297
11603215221 mod 1524599 = 1127324
10011715221 mod 1524599 = 978406
11510715221 mod 1524599 = 336239
03312015221 mod 1524599 = 1330515.
Thus the ciphertext is the list of numbers 1459719, 792327, 729432, 475592, 528380, 999910,
1080674, 55252, 943425, 255531, 633201.
Example 2: Decryption
After we receive the encrypted message formed above, we can then decrypt the message using
the decryption key as follows:
5081281445981 mod 1524599 = 085082
9
2594101445981 mod 1524599 = 071069
15054161445981 mod 1524599 = 078084
15162591445981 mod 1524599 = 058032
8121951445981 mod 1524599 = 077101
5520801445981 mod 1524599 = 101116
7432971445981 mod 1524599 = 032097
11273241445981 mod 1524599 = 116032
9784061445981 mod 1524599 = 100117
3362391445981 mod 1524599 = 115107
13305151445981 mod 1524599 = 033120.
If we convert these decrypted numbers back into characters according the ASCII correspon-
dences in Table 1, we see that it converts back into the original plaintext URGENT: Meet at
dusk!.
Example 2 eliminates the possibility for cryptanalysis using frequency analysis and is in
general more secure than Example 1. Example 2 is, however, still on an extremely small scale
compared to the parameters used in actual practice. While not obvious how, it would not
take much time for an outsider to find the prime factors p and q that created our n, which
would in turn expose the algorithm to outsiders. To obtain the high level of security RSA is
known for, modern applications use extremely large primes that are practically impossible to
find from n, even with immense computing power. As computing power is ever evolving and
improving, so has the minimum key length to consider an RSA algorithm truly secure. Today,
2048, 3072 or 4096 bit keys are typically used. This corresponds to about 617, 925, and 1233
digits, respectively. This obviously makes our 7 digit n seem very minuscule.
3 Why RSA Works
Several fundamental theorems comprise the basic foundation for why the RSA cryptosystem
works. Among these are Lagrange’s Theorem and Fermat’s Little Theorem.
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Lagrange’s Theorem: For a finite group G with identity element e, if |G| = k and g ∈ G,
then gk = e.
Fermat’s Little Theorem is a corollary to Lagrange’s Theorem, in the case where G is the set
of nonzero elements in Zp for prime p under multiplication mod p. Since it is known that the
nonzero elements in any finite field form a group under multiplication, and Zp for prime p is a
finite field, it follows that G = Z∗p is a group under multiplication mod p.
Fermat’s Little Theorem: Let p be a prime, and suppose x ∈ Z satisfies gcd(x, p) = 1. Then
xp−1 = 1 mod p.
Proof : Consider the group Z∗p for prime p under multiplication mod p. Note that |Z∗p| = p− 1,
and Z∗p has identity element e = 1. For any x ∈ Z that satisfies gcd(x, p) = 1, it follows that
x is not a multiple of p, and so y = x mod p ∈ Z∗p. But then by Lagrange’s Theorem, we have
xp−1 = yp−1 mod p = 1 mod p.
Finally, the following theorem verifies the mathematical fact that makes the RSA cryptosystem
work.
Theorem: Let p and q be distinct primes, and suppose n = pq and m = (p − 1)(q − 1). If a
and b are integers with ab = 1 mod m, then xab = x mod n for all x ∈ Zn.
Proof : If ab = 1 mod m, then ab = 1 + km for some k ∈ Z, and for all x ∈ Zn the following
will hold:
xab = x1+km = x(xkm) = x(xp−1)k(q−1).
If gcd(x, p) = 1, then by Fermat’s Little Theorem we know that xp−1 = 1 mod p. Thus,
xab = x(1)k(q−1) mod p = x mod p. Also, if gcd(x, p) 6= 1, then x = 0 mod p, and certainly
xab = x mod p. Similarly, xab = x mod q for all x ∈ Z. Thus, p|xab − x and q|xab − x, and so
pq|xab − x. That is, n|xab − x, or, equivalently, xab = x mod n [Klima, Sigmon].
4 Why RSA is Public-Key
The fact that RSA is a public-key cryptosystem means users of an RSA cipher can assume
that almost everything related to the cipher is public knowledge, including not just the form
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of the encryption calculations, but the fixed parameters in the encryption calculations as well.
This means that if an outsider were to intercept an RSA encrypted ciphertext, they could know
not only that each ciphertext integer was formed as xa mod n for some plaintext integer x and
positive integers a and n, but they could actually know the values of a and n [Klima, Sigmon].
This may seem like an extreme threat to the security of the RSA cryptosystem. However, with
sufficiently large choices for the primes p and q used to form n = pq, this is not the case.
While one may be skeptical of the security of a cryptosystem that offers so much information
to the public, we must think about what it is that makes RSA as secure as it is in practice.
Even in possession of a and n, a piece of information necessary for decryption that an outsider
would be missing is the decryption exponent b. As we have seen, b is found as a multiplicative
inverse of a mod m, i.e., ab = 1 mod m. The only way an outsider could crack the system
is to somehow manage to find such a value of b from only the knowledge of a and n. But to
find b, the outsider would have to first find m to know what modulus to use in the equation
ab = 1 mod m. And to find m = (p − 1)(q − 1), the outsider would need to know p and q. It
is the difficulty of finding p and q from n that provides RSA with its extremely high level of
security. The sad reality for outsiders is that with extremely large values for p and q, factoring
n = pq is essentially impossible. For example, if p and q were both hundreds of digits long, then
the fastest known factoring algorithms would in general take millions of years to factor n = pq,
even when programmed on a computer that could perform millions of operations per second
[Klima, Sigmon]. So, even with a and n being public knowledge, an outsider should not be
able to determine the decryption exponent b. This is precisely why the RSA cryptosystem is a
public-key system. Factoring n is not a problem for the intended recipient of an RSA ciphertext
though, since as in our Examples 1 and 2, the recipient starts the process by choosing p and q
used to form n. And of course the tremendous benefit to RSA being public-key to the users of
an RSA cipher is that they do not have to figure out a way to securely exchange an encryption
exponent and modulus for the cipher. Rather, they can just make them public knowledge.
Since RSA’s security relies on extremely large primes, it is important to note that by Euclid’s
Theorem we know that the primes are unbounded in size and number. This theorem tells us that
even with greater and greater advances of modern computing power, there will always be larger
and larger primes that we can use to continue ensuring the security of the RSA cryptosystem.
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Theorem (Euclid’s Theorem): There are infinitely many primes.
Proof : For the sake of contradiction, suppose there are finitely many primes, with the following
being a complete list: p1, p2, . . . , pn. Assume without loss of generality that p1 < p2 < · · · < pn.
Consider M = p1p2 · · · pn + 1. Then M is certainly not prime, since it is larger than pn. Since
M is not prime, it must be divisible by at least one of the primes in our complete list, say pj .
That is, pj divides M . But pj certainly divides M−1, and thus it must be the case that pj = 1.
This is a contradiction, however, since we are assuming that pj is prime. →← Therefore, there
cannot be only finitely many primes, and thus there must be infinitely many primes.
5 Primality Testing
The security of RSA relies on the use of very large primes, however finding primes large enough
to make RSA so secure is not particularly easy. Motivated in part by the development of
public-key cryptosystems like RSA, much research has been done over the past few decades
in the area of primality testing. Contrary to the name, primality testing usually focuses on
criteria that prove a number is not prime rather than criteria that prove a number is prime
[Klima, Sigmon]. In failing to find evidence that a number is not prime, we can then trust
that it is prime. This is how most methods for primality testing work. The most direct and
accurate method for testing the primality of an odd integer n is to find nontrivial factors of n
by trial and error. This could be done systematically by checking if m|n as m takes on odd
integer values starting with m = 3 and ending when m reaches
√
n [Klima, Sigmon]. This
method, however, is extremely inefficient if n is a very large number. For instance, if we were
testing n = 1697835486935464783165465534684354687 for primality, we would have to compute
1.30301016379×1018 divisions. This is a problem because we need very large primes for RSA to
be secure, but we also want to be as efficient as possible when developing the RSA algorithm.
One simple primality test is based on Fermat’s Little Theorem. If n is a prime integer, then
as a consequence of Fermat’s Little Theorem it will be true that an−1 = 1 mod n for all a ∈ Z∗n.
As a result, if an−1 6= 1 mod n for any a ∈ Z∗n, we can conclude that n is definitely not prime.
Thus, we can test the primality of an integer n by checking if an−1 = 1 mod n for some values
of a in Z∗n, with the power of the test increasing as we check more values of a [Klima, Sigmon].
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This fairly simple primality test is the one used in the Python simulator created for this thesis.
The simulator tests about 40 values of a, yielding results virtually certain to be accurate yet
still very efficient. A drawback to this primality test is that there are some values of a for
which an−1 = 1 mod n even when gcd(a, n) = 1 and n is not prime. In such cases, n is called
a pseudoprime to the base a. This may seem worrisome as to the accuracy of the Fermat
primality test, but pseudoprimes are extremely scarce compared to primes. For example, there
are only 245 pseudoprimes to the base 2 less than one million, while there are 78,498 primes
less than one million. Also, most pseudoprimes to the base 2 are not pseudoprimes to many
other bases [Klima, Sigmon]. This means that if a number is pseudoprime to the base 2 but
not to another base a, the Fermat test would still identify the number as not prime as long as
that a value is checked, hence the increased accuracy with the inclusion of more a values.
However, there are nonprime integers n that are pseudoprime to every positive base a < n
with gcd(a, n) = 1. These numbers are called Carmichael numbers. There are 2163 Carmichael
numbers less than 25 billion [Klima, Sigmon]. As can be seen, these numbers are fairly rare.
Given a randomly chosen odd integer n less than 1017, the probability that n is a Carmichael
number is only a little over 1
1011
(about one in one hundred billion) [Rabin-Miller]. The smallest
Carmichael number is 561. Using 561 as a quick example, we can see that it is pseudoprime to
all of the following choices of a which satisfy gcd(a, n) = 1:
a = 2 =⇒ 2560 = 1 mod 561
a = 13 =⇒ 13560 = 1 mod 561
a = 40 =⇒ 40560 = 1 mod 561
a = 65 =⇒ 65560 = 1 mod 561.
Note that this is only 4 choices for a, but the same result will hold with any choice of a < n
with gcd(a, n) = 1.
Another well-known primality test is the Euler Test, which is based on the fact that if n
is an odd prime, an integer can have at most two square roots mod n. In particular, the only
square roots of 1 mod n are ±1. Thus, if a = 0 mod n, then a(n−1)/2 is a square root of a(n−1) =
1 mod n, and a(n−1)/2 = ±1 mod n. So, Euler’s test tells us that if a(n−1)/2 6= ±1 mod n for
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some a with a 6= 0 mod n, then n is composite. The Euler test improves upon the Fermat
test. It is true that if the Fermat test finds that n is composite, the Euler test will as well.
However, the Euler test may find that n is composite even when the Fermat test fails to do
so. This can happen in the case of certain n values if n is an odd composite integer (other
than a prime power), because 1 will have at least 4 square roots mod n. In this case we can
have a(n−1)/2 = β mod n, where β 6= ±1 is a square root of 1. Then an−1 = 1 mod n. In
this situation, the Fermat Test (incorrectly) declares n a probable prime, but the Euler test
(correctly) declares n composite [Rabin-Miller]. Some of the Carmichael numbers that were
mentioned as issues for the Fermat test can actually be labeled as composite with the Euler
test. The following table shows a comparison of the Fermat and Euler tests with the seven
Carmichael numbers under 10000.
Number of a with Number of a with
n φ(n) an−1 = 1 mod n a(n−1) 2 = ±1 mod n
561 320 320 160
1105 768 768 364
1729 1296 1296 1296
2465 1792 1792 1792
2881 2160 2160 1080
6601 5280 5280 2640
8911 7128 7128 1782
In each case, the Fermat test will falsely identify the Carmichael number as prime because
an−1 = 1 mod n for every a with gcd(a, n) = 1, the number of which is given by φ(n). The
Euler test, however, identifies five of the seven Carmichael numbers as composite, if the right
values of a are tested. The two Carmichael numbers that cause the Euler test to fail, 1729 and
2465, are called absolute Euler pseudoprimes. There are fewer absolute Euler pseudoprimes than
Carmichael numbers, so the Euler test is considered more accurate than Fermat’s [Rabin-Miller].
Another primality test that is widely known is the Rabin-Miller test, that improves even on
Euler’s test. The limitation of the Euler test is that it does not go to any special effort to find
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square roots of 1 different from ±1. The Rabin-Miller test does do this. In the Rabin-Miller
test, we use n − 1 = 2sm, with m odd and s ≥ 1. To start the Rabin-Miller test, we compute
am mod n. If am = ±1 mod n, we declare n a probable prime, and stop. This is because we
know that an−1 = (am)2
s
= 1 mod n, and we will not find a square root of 1, other than ±1, in
repeated squaring of am to get an−1. So, if am 6= ±1 mod n, we square am mod n to obtain a2m,
unless s = 1. If a2m = 1 mod n, we declare n composite, and stop. This is due to am being a
square root of a2m = 1 mod n, different from ±1. If a2m = −1 mod n, we declare n a probable
prime, and stop. This is because, similarly to the previous, we know that an−1 = 1 mod n,
and we will not find a square root of 1, other than ±1. If neither of these are the case, unless
s = 2, we square a2m mod n to obtain a2
2m. If a2
2m = 1 mod n, we declare n composite, and
stop. If a2
2m = −1 mod n, we declare n a probable prime, and stop. Otherwise we continue
in this manner until we either we stop the test, or we have computed a2
s−1m, and stopped if
a2
s−1m = a(n−1)/2 = ±1 mod n [Rabin-Miller].
If we take the Euler absolute pseudoprime 1729, with a = 671, the Rabin-Miller test proceeds
as follows. Since 1729−1 = 1728 = 26(27), then s = 6 and m = 27. Then we have the following:
67127 = 1084 mod 1729
67127(2) = 10842 mod 1729
= 1065 mod 1729
67127(2
2) = 10652 mod 1729
= 1 mod 1729.
The test will then declare n composite and terminate.
If we test a number that is in fact prime, say n = 104513, with a = 3, the Rabin-Miller test
proceeds as follows. Since n− 1 = 104512 = 26(1633), then s = 6 and m = 1633. Then:
31633 = 88958 mod n
31633(2) = 889582 mod n
= 10430 mod n
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31633(2
2) = 104302 mod n
= 91380 mod n
31633(2
3) = 913802 mod n
= 29239 mod n
31633(2
4) = 292392 mod n
= 2781 mod n
31633(2
5) = 27812 mod n
= −1 mod n.
We could then conclude that n is a probable prime, but we might perform a few more tests
before we are truly convinced that n is actually prime.
Like the Fermat and Euler tests, the Rabin-Miller test has pseudoprimes, with the choices
of a with which the test declares a composite integer to be a probable prime. Rabin-Miller
pseudoprimes are called strong pseudoprimes. There are fewer strong pseudoprimes than Fermat
or Euler pseudoprimes. More importantly, there are no Rabin-Miller absolute pseudoprimes,
which are those pseudoprimes that pass an integer off as prime for every a value that can be
chosen [Rabin-Miller]. This is what makes the Rabin-Miller test so strong and one of the most
commonly used.
6 Integer Factorization
The security of RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring n, which should be the product of two
very large distinct primes p and q. This relation between factoring and cryptography is one
reason why interest in evaluating the practical difficulty of the integer factorization problem
in the mathematical community has increased in recent years. Currently the limits of our
factoring capabilities lie around 130 decimal digits [Lenstra]. This is why having a very large
n, ideally larger than this upper bound of 130, makes RSA practically unbreakable even with
modern computing power. Earlier we saw the sizes of n typically used in practice for the
RSA algorithm, namely 2048, 3072, or 4096 bit keys. These bit sizes correspond to about 617,
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925, and 1233 decimal digits, respectively, which are obviously all significantly longer than 130
decimal digits. This is precisely why RSA is such a secure cryptosystem. On the other hand,
although integer factorization is considered very difficult, especially under the constraints of
computing power, there are a few integer factorization methods that we should consider.
The most obvious method for integer factorization involves trial and error. Trial division
consists of systematically testing whether n is divisible by any smaller number. However, for
efficiency’s sake, it would only make sense to see if n were divisible by any prime numbers
smaller than it. This is because if we test some number x and find it is not a factor, than any
multiple of x will also not be a factor of n. Furthermore, the factors tried need go no higher
than
√
n, since if n were divisible by some number r, then n = r× s, and if s were smaller than
r, n would have earlier been detected as being divisible by s or a prime factor of s. There are
several issues with this method, specifically when working with n values as large as the ones
employed in the RSA algorithm. To try and make the trial and error method more efficient we
would have to only test prime numbers, but when we are looking at larger and larger sets of
possible factors we have to be able to determine which numbers are actually prime before we
test them. This brings us back to the difficulty and efficiency issues associated with primality
testing. Time is also an issue, as we add more and more digits to n, the time to carry out trial
divisions increases exponentially. For these reasons, the trial divisions method is considered
extremely inefficient and an insufficient method when dealing with such large n values.
Another well-known method that is fairly simple is Fermat’s factorization method. This
particular method is extremely useful for factoring integers that are the product of two very
large distinct primes that are close together. Let n = pq be the product of two distinct primes,
and suppose that we would like to determine the values of p and q from n. This is the heart
of the security of RSA. If someone were to find the p and q used in the algorithm, the security
would instantly collapse. If p and q were relatively close together, then even if they were both
very large, we could determine them fairly quickly using Fermat’s factorization as follows. Let
x = p+q2 and y =
p−q
2 . Then n = pq = x
2−y2 = (x+y)(x−y). Since n has prime factors p and
q, it follows that p and q would have to be x + y and x − y. To determine p and q, we would
only have to find the values of x and y. In order to do this, we could begin by assuming that x
is the smallest integer larger than
√
n. Since n = x2− y2, if we have assumed the correct value
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of x, then it will follow that x2−n will be the perfect square y2. If this is not the case, then we
would know that we had assumed an incorrect value for x, and we could simply increase x by
one and repeat the process until the correct x is found. If p and q are relatively close together,
then the number of times that this process would have to be repeated would be relatively small
[Klima, Sigmon]. This is exactly why this method is useful in this case.
As an example of Fermat’s factorization method, suppose we wanted to find the two prime
factors of n = pq = 108371. The smallest integer larger than
√
108371 is 330, so this would
be our first x. But then 3302 − n = 529 = 232, and so we have found the correct values for x
and y on the first trial, x = 330 and y = 23. The prime factors of n are then x+ y = 353 and
x − y = 307. Because these factors are so close to each other, we were able to find them very
quickly.
If we use an n created with primes separated by a little more distance, say n = 69841, then
we will most likely have to repeat the process more than once. The smallest integer larger
than
√
69841 is 265, which will be our first x. Then 2652 − n = 384, which is not a perfect
square. This means x = 265 is not correct, and so now we try x = 266. Then 2662 − n = 915,
which is also not a perfect square. With x = 267, we have 2672 − n = 1448, which is also
not a perfect square. With x = 268, we have 2682 − n = 1983 which is also not a perfect
square. With x = 269, we have 2692 − n = 2520 which is also not a perfect square. With
x = 270, we have 2702 − n = 3059, which is also not a perfect square. With x = 271, we have
2712 − n = 3600 = 602, and so we have finally found the right values for x and y, 271 and 60,
respectively. Our prime factors for 69841 are then x + y = 331 and x − y = 211. You can see
that the farther apart p and q are, the more repetitions of the factorization method are needed
to find the right x and y values.
Another well-known method for integer factorization is Pollard’s rho method, which is ba-
sically a modification of the trial division method that increases the odds of finding a factor of
n. The trial division method essentially chooses one number at a time and tests to see if that
number is indeed a factor of n. Pollard’s rho method chooses k numbers, {x1, . . . , xk}, and
tests whether gcd(|xi − xj |, n) > 1. In other words, we ask if xi − xj and n have a non-trivial
factor in common. This at once increases the number of chances for successes. For example,
if we ask how many numbers divide n = pq, we have just two: p and q. But if we ask how
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many numbers satisfy gcd(x, n) > 1, we have many more: p, 2p, . . . , (q − 1)p, q, 2q, . . . ,
(p − 1)q, pq. So, for Pollard’s rho algorithm, we generate random numbers one by one and
check two consecutive numbers. This process is repeated until a factor is found. A function f
is used that will generate pseudorandom numbers. In other words, we will keep applying f to
generate numbers that seem random for the purpose of this algorithm. One such function that
has the pseudorandom property is f(x) = x2 + a mod n. We start with x1 = 2 or some other
number. We then find x2 = f(x1), x3 = f(x2), etc., following the general rule xn+1 = f(xn)
[Pollard’s Rho]. If we use n = 55 as an example, Pollard’s rho method can be carried out as
follows with f(x) = x2 + 2 mod 55:
xn xn+1 gcd(|xn − xn+1|, n)
2 6 1
6 38 1
38 16 11
The last line in this table tells us that 11 is a factor of 55. From that, we can determine the
other factor by calculating 5511 = 5.
The number n = 55 is obviously very small with small p and q, so we can show the Pollard’s
rho method with a slightly larger n, say n = 707 with f(x) = x2 + 1 mod 707:
xn xn+1 gcd(|xn − xn+1|, n)
2 5 1
5 26 7
The last line in this table tells us that 7 is a factor of 707. From that, we can determine the
other factor by calculating 7077 = 101.
Even though the value of n in our second example of Pollard’s rho method was larger than
in the first example, the method found the factor just as quickly. This is because Pollard’s
rho method is very efficient for factoring fairly small numbers or large n values with one factor
being significantly smaller than the other. This is in contrast to Fermat’s factorization method,
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which was optimized when the factors p and q were relatively close together. Still, this method
is quite inefficient when dealing with the massive n values used in practice with the RSA
cryptosystem. One of the problems with Pollard’s rho method is that it can generate sequences
that cycle and hence never produce a factor. Floyd’s cycle finding algorithm, and later Brent’s
cycle finding algorithm have been integrated into Pollard’s rho method to prevent these issues
[Pollard’s Rho].
As a final note regarding integer factorization, in comparison of the problems of primality
testing and integer factorization, factoring a known non-prime integer is in general significantly
more time-consuming than finding a prime of approximately the same size. This is really what
makes RSA useful in practice. As we have mentioned, the security of RSA is based on the
apparent difficulty of factoring a number that is the product of two very large distinct primes.
To be more precise, the security of RSA is based on the fact that it would apparently be much
more time-consuming for an outsider to factor the publicly known value of n = pq than for the
intended recipient of the message to choose p and q [Klima, Sigmon].
7 Modular Exponentiation
Encrypting and decrypting messages using the RSA cryptosystem securely requires modular
exponentiation with extremely large bases and exponents. Say we needed to raise the following
ciphertext:
39705667751051336812284136334817473485289
to the following power:
54299300950841826990071853678997985400035
and reduce the result mod the following modulus:
200033699955714283345172521584008468989639.
Even if we used the fastest computer on the planet, completing this calculation by actually
multiplying the ciphertext by itself repeatedly with a total number of factors equal to the
power would essentially take forever [Klima, Sigmon]. When implementing RSA, there is a
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necessity to encrypt and decrypt messages efficiently so that the processes can be carried out in
a reasonable length of time rather than essentially taking forever. There are much more efficient
ways to do these kinds of modular exponentiation calculations that can be done very quickly
and allow us to avoid efficiency issues. For example, consider the first decryption calculation
5081281445981 mod 1524599 in Example 2 of Section 2. This calculation can be done in a more
efficient manner than actually multiplying 508128 by itself repeatedly with a total of 1445981
factors. To do this calculation efficiently, we first find the values of 5081282
i
mod 1524599 for i =
1, 2, . . . , 20. So for P = 508128 and M = 1524599, we begin by computing P 2, P 4, P 8, ..., P 2
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,
and reducing each result modulo M . Note that each P 2
i
mod M can be found by squaring
P 2
i−1
mod M , so finding these values requires a total of only 20 multiplications. The modular
exponentiation for our example could then be completed by calculating the following:
P 1445981 mod M = P 1048576+262144+131072+4096+64+16+8+4+1 mod M
= P 2
20+218+217+212+26+24+23+22+20 mod M
= P 2
20
P 2
18
P 2
17
P 2
12
P 2
6
P 2
4
P 2
3
P 2
2
P 2
0
mod M.
This would only require 8 additional multiplications, so this technique could be used to perform
the entire modular exponentiation with a total of only 20 + 8 = 28 multiplications. This is
obviously a vast improvement over the number of multiplications required to find the result by
multiplying P by itself repeatedly with a total of 1445981 factors.
The technique for efficiently calculating P a mod M described in the previous paragraph
will in general require at most 2 log2(a) multiplications. So even for the massive modular
exponentiation described at the beginning of this section, the technique would require at most
the following number of multiplications [Klima, Sigmon]:
2× log2(54299300950841826990071853678997985400035) ≈ 270.
Again, this is obviously a tremendous improvement over multiplying the base by itself repeatedly
with a total of the following number of factors:
54299300950841826990071853678997985400035.
For the Python simulator created for this thesis, a technique for efficient modular exponentiation
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that is predefined in Python was employed. This technique is almost certainly the technique
described in this section.
8 Digital Signatures
RSA being public-key can lead to issues in the verification of the sender of an encrypted message.
If we assume that our encryption exponent a and value for n are made public, we typically
assume that this information could be accessed by anyone, and not just the intended point of
correspondence. If we suppose that there is a group of people who wish to communicate over
insecure lines of communication using RSA, and each person has their own secret values of p
and q, then each person could make public their a and n. Upon receiving an encrypted message
however, the issue comes in determining if the message came from the person claiming to have
sent it. This is where the concept of digital signatures comes in.
Suppose we want to send a secret message, P , to a colleague across an insecure line of
communication. Assume that our personal modulus n1 and encryption exponent a1 are public
and our decryption exponent b1 is kept secret while our colleague has made public their personal
modulus n2 and encryption exponent a2 while their decryption exponent b2 is kept secret.
Assume also that n1 < n2. Normally, to encrypt the plaintext P to send to our colleague
we would calculate P a2 mod n2. To incorporate a digital signature, we could instead apply
our own decryption exponent and modulus first by calculating P1 = P
b1 mod n1, and then
send to our colleague the ciphertext C1 formed by C1 = P
a2
1 mod n2. Our colleague could
then easily decrypt this ciphertext by first applying their decryption exponent and modulus to
obtain P1 = C
b2
1 mod n2, and then using our public encryption exponent and modulus to obtain
P = P a11 mod n1. Since the decryption exponent b1 used before the encryption is only known to
us, our colleague would then know that the message could have only come from us. Because it
has the effect of authenticating the message, applying our own decryption exponent and modulus
in the encryption of a message is sometimes called signing the message [Klima, Sigmon].
Example: Encryption with a Digital Signature
To send our colleague the message Meeting time changed to 12! we would first convert it to
its numerical equivalent under the ASCII correspondences, resulting in the following numerical
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plaintext P :
077101101116105110103032116105109101032099104097110103101100032116111032049050033.
Now, say that we have chosen p = 12517 and q = 154897, and formed n1 = 1938845749,
a1 = 19386785, and b1 = 1595863265. Suppose our colleague has chosen p = 18013 and
q = 200003, and formed n2 = 3602654039, a2 = 36024365, and b2 = 3292142165. Note that
n1 < n2. The first step will be to split P into blocks smaller than n1, and apply our own
decryption exponent b1 and modulus n1 to these blocks to form blocks for P1. Note that since
n2 is 10 digits long, we can group three plaintext characters at a time:
0771011011595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1562102271
1161051101595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1920418988
1030321161595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1353617224
1051091011595863265 mod 1938845749 = 158917195
0320991041595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1315419167
0971101031595863265 mod 1938845749 = 529371812
1011000321595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1346893900
1161110321595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1268387943
0490500331595863265 mod 1938845749 = 1402501352.
Now we can form blocks for the ciphertext C1 by raising these P1 blocks to the a2 mod n2:
156210227136024365 mod 3602654039 = 2536616313
192041898836024365 mod 3602654039 = 1413314080
135361722436024365 mod 3602654039 = 2529883408
15891719536024365 mod 3602654039 = 3493306487
131541916736024365 mod 3602654039 = 3175216239
52937181236024365 mod 3602654039 = 1443314018
134689390036024365 mod 3602654039 = 1688039043
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126838794336024365 mod 3602654039 = 1613024412
140250135236024365 mod 3602654039 = 2381003738.
Our colleague can start the decryption process by raising these C1 blocks to the b2 mod n2.
Note that the results are the P1 blocks:
25366163133292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1562102271
14133140803292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1920418988
25298834083292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1353617224
34933064873292142165 mod 3602654039 = 158917195
31752162393292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1315419167
14433140183292142165 mod 3602654039 = 529371812
16880390433292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1346893900
16130244123292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1268387943
23810037383292142165 mod 3602654039 = 1402501352.
Our colleague can then complete the decryption process by raising these P1 blocks to the a1
mod n1. Note that the results are the P blocks:
156210227119386785 mod 1938845749 = 077101101
192041898819386785 mod 1938845749 = 116105110
135361722419386785 mod 1938845749 = 103032116
15891719519386785 mod 1938845749 = 105109101
131541916719386785 mod 1938845749 = 032099104
52937181219386785 mod 1938845749 = 097110103
134689390019386785 mod 1938845749 = 101100032
126838794319386785 mod 1938845749 = 116111032
140250135219386785 mod 1938845749 = 049050033.
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Since, the original plaintext was recovered, our identity was authenticated to our colleague. If
the original plaintext was unable to be recovered using our public encryption exponent, our
colleague would know that we were not the actual originator of the message.
Recall that we assumed the condition for this digital signature scheme that our modulus
n1 was less than our colleague’s modulus n2. This is because if n2 < n1, the P1 blocks could
potentially be larger than n2, and thus not be recoverable in the first decryption step. To
avoid this potential problem, if n2 < n1, we could just reverse the order of the encryption and
signing calculations. That is, in encryption, instead of using b1 and n1 first and then a2 and
n2 second, we could use a2 and n2 first and then b1 and n1 second. This would guarantee that
the calculations could be reversed correctly.
9 Python Simulator Description
Some of the features included in the RSA Python simulator created for this project are outlined
throughout this thesis. This section synthesizes everything into an overview of what exactly
the simulator does and how it simulates the RSA cryptosystem. The core of the program lives
in the RSA method. This is where most of the actual RSA simulations are taking place. To
supplement this main method, five additional methods are included. These are a toNumber
method, a toLetter method, a euclidean method, an isprime method, and a gcd method. The
toNumber method takes a string as a parameter and uses Python’s predefined “ord” function
to convert characters into their ASCII representations. For ASCII representations that are less
than 100, a leading 0 is added to make sure all ASCII representations are three digits in length.
Similarly, the toLetter method takes in a string of numbers which are then examined three
digits at a time and converted to the character representation using Python’s predefined “chr”
function. The euclidean method is a coded version of the Euclidean algorithm that is used in
the RSA process to find the decryption exponent b that satisfies ab = 1 mod m. In other words
the euclidean method finds the multiplicative inverse of a given a when working with a given
mod m. Both of these values are parameters to the euclidean method. The next method is the
primality test I chose to implement, isprime. As mentioned earlier I used the Fermat primality
test and tested about 40 bases. The method will return false if the number given as a parameter
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is found to be composite, and true otherwise. The gcd method is a method to compute the gcd
of two numbers which are given as parameters.
Within the RSA method itself, the simulator begins by asking the user if they are the sender
or the receiver in the given scenario.
Figure 1: Simulation Prompt
This is essentially asking whether users want to encrypt or decrypt a message. If the user indi-
cates they are the sender, then they will be prompted to enter the public encryption exponent
a and the public modulus n of the person they are sending a message to, and the plaintext
message they want to send.
Figure 2: Simulation Encryption with Example 2
The simulator also requires n > 126 so that the ASCII representations of plaintext characters
could be used.
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Figure 3: Simulation Requirement for n
The simulator is designed to go through the process of finding the right number of groupings
for the plaintext and then encrypting these groupings using the information provided by the
user. The resulting ciphertext is then returned to the user instantly.
If the user had indicated that they were the receiver, the simulator asks whether they want
to decrypt a message or create parameters.
Figure 4: Simulation Receiver Options
If the user wishes to create parameters, the user is asked for numbers close to what they would
like their values of p and q to be. With these inputs, the isprime method is used to find the
smallest prime numbers larger than the given inputs. These primes are shown to the user as
their p and q. The resulting value of n is also shown as well as a possible value for a to use
as their public encryption exponent. This creates all of the parameters needed in order for
someone to begin receiving messages.
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Figure 5: Simulation Parameters
If the user wishes to decrypt a message, the user is prompted to enter their values for p, q, and
a. Notice they are not prompted for the decryption exponent because this is calculated within
the program using the euclidean method. This makes it so that the user never has to calculate
any of these values on their own, a valid a can be given if they create parameters, and they do
not have to worry about calculating the value of b in order to decrypt a message. After these
prompts, the user can enter the ciphertext. The way encrypted messages are returned by the
simulator is in blocks of numbers separated by commas, so this is required of ciphertexts to
be decrypted as well. Once all of this information is gathered from the user, the ciphertext is
decrypted using the decryption algorithm. The plaintext is then returned to the user.
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Figure 6: Simulation Decryption with Example 2
The entire simulator runs on an infinite loop, so as long as the user does not enter the word
“exit” after they have completed an interaction, the program will start again from the beginning.
10 Python Simulator Code
de f RSA( ) :
end = ””
whi le ( end != ” e x i t ” ) :
p r i n t ”Are you the sender or the r e c e i v e r ?”
p r in t ” Enter s f o r sender or r f o r r e c e i v e r . ”
ans = raw input ( )
c t ex t = ””
whi le ( ans != ” s ” and ans != ” r ” ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! Enter s f o r sender or r f o r r e c e i v e r . ”
ans = raw input ( )
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i f ( ans == ” s ” ) :
p r i n t ” Enter the value f o r a”
a = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
p r i n t ” Enter the value f o r n”
n = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
whi l e (n < 1 2 7 ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! n must be at l e a s t 127”
p r in t ” Enter the value f o r n”
n = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
p r i n t ” Enter the p l a i n t e x t you would l i k e to send ”
ptext = raw input ( )
ptext = toNumber ( ptext )
#determine l ength o f groupings to encrypt
i f ( l en ( s t r (n ) ) % 3 == 0 ) :
i f ( l en ( s t r (n ) ) == 3 ) :
l ength = 3
e l s e :
l ength = len ( s t r (n ) ) − 3
e l s e :
i = 3
whi l e ( i + 3 < l en ( s t r (n ) ) ) :
i = i + 3
length = i
plength = len ( ptext )
numgroups = plength / l ength
l e f t o v e r = plength % length
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f o r i in range (0 , numgroups ∗ l ength , l ength ) :
encrypt = ””
f o r j in range ( i , i + length ) :
encrypt += ptext [ j ]
encrypt = i n t ( encrypt )
encrypt = s t r (pow( encrypt , a , n ) )
whi l e ( l en ( encrypt ) < l ength ) :
encrypt = ”0” + encrypt
encrypt += ” ,”
c t ex t += encrypt
encrypt = ””
i f ( l e f t o v e r != 0 ) :
f o r i in range ( l e f t o v e r ) :
encrypt += ptext [ ( numgroups∗ l ength ) + i ]
pad = length − l e f t o v e r
f o r i in range ( pad ) :
encrypt += ”0”
encrypt = i n t ( encrypt )
encrypt = s t r (pow( encrypt , a , n ) )
whi l e ( l en ( encrypt ) < l ength ) :
encrypt = ”0” + encrypt
c t ex t += encrypt
p r i n t ”The r e s u l t i n g c i p h e r t e x t i s : ” , c t ex t
p r i n t
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e l s e :
p r i n t ”Are you c r e a t i n g parameters or
decrypt ing a message you r e c e i v e d ?”
p r in t ” Enter p to c r e a t e parameters and d to decrypt . ”
cho i c e = raw input ( )
whi l e ( cho i c e != ”p” and cho i c e != ”d ” ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! Enter p to c r e a t e parameters or d to decrypt . ”
cho i c e = raw input ( )
i f ( cho i c e == ”p ” ) :
#Help c r e a t e primes p and q
pr in t ” Enter a number , the next prime a f t e r t h i s number”
p r in t ” w i l l be used as the prime f o r p . ”
pp = i n t ( raw input ( ) ) + 1
whi le ( i sp r ime (pp) != True ) :
pp += 1
pr in t ” Enter a number , the next prime a f t e r t h i s number”
p r in t ” w i l l be used as the prime f o r q . ”
qq = i n t ( raw input ( ) ) + 1
whi le ( i sp r ime ( qq ) != True ) :
qq += 1
pr in t ”Your prime p i s ” , pp
pr in t ”Your prime q i s ” , qq
p r in t ”Using these va lue s f o r p and q ,
the n value to send i s ” , pp∗qq
#Help f i n d an a s . t . gcd ( a ,m) = 1
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mm = (pp − 1) ∗ ( qq − 1)
aa = max( i n t (mm ∗ . 0 1 ) , 10)
whi l e ( gcd ( aa , mm) != 1 or ( aa <= pp or aa <= qq ) ) :
aa += 1
pr in t ”A p o s s i b l e a value i s : ” , aa
i f ( cho i c e == ”d ” ) :
p r i n t ” Enter the value o f p”
p = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
whi l e ( i sp r ime (p) != True ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! p value i s not prime . ”
p r i n t ” Enter another va lue f o r p . ”
p = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
p r i n t ” Enter the value o f q”
q = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
whi l e ( i sp r ime ( q ) != True ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! q va lue i s not prime . ”
p r i n t ” Enter another va lue f o r q . ”
q = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
m = (p−1) ∗ (q−1)
p r i n t ” Enter the value o f a”
a = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
whi l e ( gcd ( a ,m) != 1 ) :
p r i n t ” Error ! a must be r e l a t i v e l y prime to n . ”
p r i n t ” Enter a v a l i d a . ”
a = i n t ( raw input ( ) )
p r i n t ” Enter the c i p h e r t e x t you r e c e i v e d . ”
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pr in t ” I f c i p h e r t e x t i s separated by commas ,
ente r the groupings i n c l u d i n g commas . ”
p r i n t ”Do not ente r any spaces between numbers or commas . ”
c = raw input ( )
c t ex t = c . s p l i t ( ” , ” )
n = p∗q
m = (p−1)∗(q−1)
ptext = ””
b = euc l i d ean ( a , m)
i f (b < 0 ) :
b = b + m
p l a i n t e x t = [”” f o r i in range ( l en ( c t ex t ) ) ]
b lock = 0
f o r i in range ( l en ( c t ex t ) ) :
p l a i n t e x t [ i ] = s t r (pow( i n t ( c t ex t [ i ] ) , b , n ) )
i f ( l en ( p l a i n t e x t [ i ] ) > block ) :
b lock = len ( p l a i n t e x t [ i ] )
temp = ””
f o r i in range ( l en ( c t ex t ) ) :
i f ( l en ( p l a i n t e x t [ i ] ) < block ) :
temp = ””
i f ( l en ( p l a i n t e x t [ i ] ) % 3 != 1 ) :
temp += ”0” + p l a i n t e x t [ i ]
i f ( l en ( temp ) < block ) :
j = block − l en ( temp )
f o r k in range ( j ) :
temp += ”0”
ptext += temp
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e l s e :
ptext += p l a i n t e x t [ i ]
#pr in t ptext
p r i n t ”The p l a i n t e x t i s : ” , t oLe t t e r ( ptext )
p r i n t ””
p r in t ”To run the s imu la t i on again , p r e s s ente r . ”
p r i n t ”To e x i t the s imulat ion , ente r the word e x i t . ”
end = raw input ( )
de f toNumber ( s ) :
num = ””
hold = 0
f o r i in range ( l en ( s ) ) :
hold = ord ( s [ i ] )
i f ( l en ( s t r ( hold ) ) < 3 ) :
num += ”0” + s t r ( hold )
e l s e :
num += s t r ( hold )
re turn num
def t oLe t t e r ( s ) :
l e t t e r = ””
f o r i in range (0 , l en ( s ) − 2 , 3 ) :
cur r ent = s [ i ] + s [ i +1] + s [ i +2]
l e t t e r += chr ( i n t ( cur rent ) )
re turn l e t t e r
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de f euc l i d ean ( a , m) :
q = [ 0 , 0 ]
r = [m, a ]
u = [ 1 , 0 ]
v = [ 0 , 1 ]
i = 2
rem = 0
whi le ( rem != 1 ) :
rem = m % a
r . i n s e r t ( i , rem)
quo = i n t (m/a )
q . i n s e r t ( i , quo )
u . i n s e r t ( i , u [ i −2] − u [ i −1]∗q [ i ] )
v . i n s e r t ( i , v [ i −2] − v [ i −1]∗q [ i ] )
m = a
a = rem
i = i+1
b = v [ l en ( v ) − 1 ]
re turn b
de f i sp r ime (n ) :
a = 2
f o r i in range ( 4 0 ) :
whi l e ( gcd (a , n) != 1 ) :
a += 1
i f (pow( a , n−1, n) != 1 ) :
r e turn Fal se
a += 1
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re turn True
de f gcd (x , y ) :
whi l e ( x != 0 ) :
rem = y % x
fac = y / x
y = x
x = rem
return y
RSA( )
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